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The judgment in the LM case was expected as the first (and so far the only) opportunity for
the CJEU to assess the consequences of the systemic changes restricting judicial
independence in Poland. It hinges on the horizontal aspect of the changes – verifying the
state of the rule of law by courts of the other Member States. In the case, in which the
European Arrest Warrant (EAW) was issued by a Polish judicial authority against a person
prosecuted for a drug related crime, the defendant argued before an Irish court that due to
the reforms of the Polish judiciary there is a risk of denial of justice if he is transferred to
Poland. By deciding it the CJEU drew red lines but arguably established no adequate
consequences of crossing them. The Luxemburg court focused on the protection of
individuals, leaving the issue of systemic consequences to the Council acting on the basis
of Article 7 TEU.
The Irish question was based on the CJEU’s case law related to the protection of
fundamental rights in the context of mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters
(Aranyosi). According to this case, if the court taking the decision on extradition on the
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basis of an EAW possesses evidence of systemic or generalised deficiencies in the
protection of fundamental right in the issuing Member State, it should postpone the
execution and assess whether the individual concerned will be exposed to a real risk of an
inhuman or degrading treatment because of the conditions during detention. The LM
judgment followed this path and based its answer on a similar pattern: if the court executing
a EAW from another Member State possesses the information that there is a real risk of a
breach of the fundamental right to fair trial due to systemic or generalised deficiencies
concerning the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary, it shall assess
whether the person incurs such a risk if he is surrendered to that State (individual
assessment) (para 79).
It can be argued that the individual assessment required by the Aranyosi judgment is not
the proper test in the LM case due to three reasons. Firstly, regular control reverses the
logic of the mutual trust developed by the CJEU. Secondly, there is a substantial difference
between fundamental rights and the independence of judiciary. Infringements of the latter
require other legal mechanisms of protection. Thirdly, the Polish institutional changes
affecting judicial independence may influence all 26 EU acts providing for mutual
recognition of judgments. A broader perspective should be taken.
Regular mutual control contrary to the spirit of mutual
trust
According to the CJEU the principle of mutual trust has a fundamental importance and
“requires (…) each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the
other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental
rights recognised by EU law” (opinion 2/13, para 191). But in para 69 of the LM judgment
the Court seems to introduce an obligation of a regular control to be pursued by the
executing court when the issuing member state has been subject of a (well) reasoned
proposal adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU based on actions
impairing the independence of national courts. Maybe the CJEU treated this obligation as a
tool of pressure on the member state restricting the independence of judiciary contrary to
the recommendations of the Commission – applied until the decision on the basis of Article
7 TEU is taken. But a regular control of judicial decisions from other member state reverses
the logic of mutual trust and can impair it in the long term. It would be better from the
perspective of mutual trust if a decision of a member state to restrict the independence of
the courts (assessed as systemic deficiencies) implies a suspension of participation in all
legal acts based on mutual trust in the administration of justice.
Substantial differences between fundamental rights and
the independence of judiciary
There is a substantial difference between fundamental rights and the independence of
judiciary. Both values are certainly interconnected: the independence of judiciary is in
particular a part of the right to fair trial. But it is not limited to this aspect. Fundamental
rights are entitlements of individuals and it is therefore possible to verify whether they are
ensured in individual situations. The independence of judiciary is important in an individual
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case, but it also remains a key element of the state’s system, indispensable to ensure the
right balance between public and private interests. In the EU, it is also guarantees securing
the effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law. It is important especially if
the executive power in a member state openly declares the protection of its own nationals
and ignores the European citizenship context. For example, the in case of a child abduction
to another state the principle established in the Hague convention and regulation Brussels
II bis is that the authority shall order the return of the child forthwith except in exceptional
cases. But Polish government treats children which have a Polish parent as Polish children
(ignoring the parent of other nationality) and does not hide the wish that they stay in
Poland. A law on the central authority in family matters was recently adopted to enable the
Ministry of Justice to supervise judicial proceedings in child abduction cases. It provides i.a.
for the right of the Ministry to inquire courts about pending cases and for the obligation of
the courts to answer them immediately. The purpose of such a supervision is clear from the
title of a Ministry’s leaflet – “Stop to transferring Polish children abroad” and from the
information on the Ministry of Justice website: “Under current law Ministry of Justice has
not had possibilities of efficient supervision on such cases. (…) It is time to finish with it.
State must protect Polish children”.
Individual assessment often not feasible in European
judicial area
The Irish question relates only to the EAW, but a broader perspective shall be taken as the
restriction of independence of judiciary has a potential impact on all the acts providing for
mutual recognition of judgments – in criminal (10 framework decisions and 2 directives) and
civil matters (14 regulations). The level of integration in the field of judicial cooperation is so
high that the judgments of one country are treated as judicial decisions of another member
state. For example, in civil cases the majority of judgments is automatically recognised and
enforceable in the other member states. In all the EU acts on mutual recognition the review
of jurisdiction of another MS or of the content of the judgment to be recognized is
prohibited. In some legal instruments, there are even no legal mechanisms allowing to
refuse recognition/execution (for example in case of maintenance or Article 42 of
2201/2003 regulation related to child return decisions).
Conclusions
In the LM case the CJEU could have stated that the European area of justice is based on a
high level of mutual trust in the administration of justice, but at the same time on the
responsibility of MSs to ensure independence of the courts. Such an obligation was
recently confirmed by the CJEU in the case Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,
para 37. In this case the judicial independence was derived mainly from Articles 2, 4 (3) and
19 TEU, while Article 47 of the Charter was treated only as a subsidiary source. The LM
judgment takes Article 2 TEU as a starting point (para 35), repeating the statements of the
Associação judgment (paras 51-54) and confirming the importance of judicial
independence in the context of the EAW (paras 55-58). But these general statements do
not influence the result of the LM case. In the answer given to the Irish court judicial
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independence is reduced to the right of an individual to an independent court as a part of a
right to a fair trial (paras 59-60 and subs.). It is a step back in comparison to the
Associação judgment.
A breach of the obligation to ensure independence of the courts should logically result in
suspending the participation of a given MS in this EU policy not (only) because the
individual right can be impaired but because of the protection of other member states and
the EU. It is probable that in the majority of cases Polish judges will resist the political
influence. But the courts in other member states will never know whether it actually is the
case. They would have to make embarrassing investigations about the substantial issues
of the cases and of the division of powers in Poland. It can contravene the spirit of mutual
trust between the courts and often will be impossible in practice.
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